Posted by Most wanted
It is not insignificant that some have resorted to so-called parliamentary procedure to impede the debate of the SAPP no-confidence motion.
It is as clear a sign as any that those who cite standing orders, and those whose interests they serve, would rather not have the motion debated at all. If our experience with the previous Speaker of Parliament is anything to go by, it is possible to make motions disappear in Parliament. All that is needed is a unilateral declaration of irrelevance or a lack of urgency or, as is now suggested, that procedure must be followed.
It is apparent that if attempts are made by SAPP members of parliament to have the motion debated on Monday, the Speaker will be called upon to adjourn the debate of the Motion on the basis that standing orders have not been complied with. Lim Kit Siang has suggested that as there are no specific standing orders on a no-confidence motion, such a motion would be treated as an ordinary motion under Standing Order 27. This requires fourteen days notice and is subject to the Speaker’s discretion. Order 18 which provides for urgent debates on matters of public interest requires forty-eight hours notice and, according to Minister Nazri Aziz, does not allow for a vote.
I am not certain that this is the best or correct way to approach the issue.
The Federal Constitution provides that the Houses of Parliament regulate their own procedure (Article 62). The Speaker is the chief officer of the legislative body, in this case the Dewan Rakyat. He presides at its sittings, exercising authority and power that are in actuality the powers of the Dewan Rakyat which the Dewan Rakyat is taken as having committed to the Speaker for practical purpose. This is the source of the Speaker’s discretion, a state of affairs reinforced by the constitutional provision providing for the election of the Speaker (Article 57).
As in any Westminster system, control over Executive action is a crucial function of parliament. This arises from the Executive being responsible to parliament, the Prime Minister and his cabinet being members of either the Dewan Rakyat or the Senate. Parliament as such supervises administration and influences governmental policies. In this scheme of things, the Prime Minister undoubtedly plays a vital role. As the renowned constitutional law jurist, M P Jain, observes:
“He keeps the fabric of parliamentary form of government in working order. The entire constitutional machinery would appear to revolve around his personality. He has thus been described as ‘the keystone of the Cabinet arch,’ who is central to its formation, central to its life, and central to its death.”
It is for this reason that upon a new Dewan Rakyat being constituted after a general election, the appointment of the Prime Minister is a matter of great urgency. The Prime Minister is by convention the leader of the political party or coalition that forms the majority of the Dewan Rakyat though this is strictly not necessary. The Federal Constitution stipulates that it is the member of the Dewan Rakyat that in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Dewan that is to be appointed as the Prime Minister (Article 43(2)). As we have recently seen in Perlis and Trengganu, this may not necessarily be a matter of having a sufficient number of members of parliament supporting the appointment.
It is equally significant that the Federal Constitution expressly provides (Article 43(4) that:
“If the Prime Minister ceases to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, then, unless at his request the Yang di-Pertuan Agong dissolves Parliament, the Prime Minister shall tender the resignation of the Cabinet.”